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BACKGROUND: Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus (MRSA) is an escalating problem in hospitals worldwide.
The hospital reservoir for MRSA includes recognized and unrec-
ognized colonized or infected patients, as well as previously colo-
nized or infected patients readmitted to the hospital. Early and
appropriate infection control measures (ICM) are key elements to
reduce MRSA transmission and to control the hospital reservoir. 
OBJECTIVE: To describe the role of an expert system
applied to the control of MRSA at a large medical center (1,600
beds) with high endemic rates.
METHODS: The University Hospital of Geneva has an
extended hospital information system (HIS), DIOGENE, struc-
tured with an open distributed architecture. It includes adminis-
trative, medical, nursing, and laboratory applications with their
relational databases. Among available patient databases, clinical
microbiology laboratory and admission-discharge-transfer (ADT)
databases are used to generate computer alerts. A laboratory alert
(lab alert) is printed daily in the Infection Control Program (ICP)
offices, listing all patients with cultures positive for MRSA detect-
ed within the preceding 24 hours. Patients might be either newly
detected patients colonized or infected with MRSA, or previously
recognized MRSA patients having surveillance cultures. The ICP
nurses subsequently go to the ward or call the ward personnel to
implement ICM. A second alert, the “readmission alert,” detects
readmission to the hospital of any patient previously colonized or
infected with MRSA by periodic queries (q 1 min) to the ADT data-
base. The readmission alert is printed in the ICP offices, but also
forwarded with added guidelines to the emergency room.
RESULTS: During the first 12 months of application (July
1994 to June 1995), the lab alert detected an average of 4.6 isolates
per day, corresponding to 314 hospital admissions (248 patients);
the use of this alert saved time for the ICP nurses by improving
work organization. There were 438 readmission alerts (1.2 alerts
per day) over the study period; of 347 patients screened immedi-
ately upon readmission, 114 (33%) were positive for MRSA car-
riage. Delayed recognition of readmitted MRSA carriers
decreased significantly after the implementation of this alert; the
proportion of MRSA patients recognized at the time of admission
to the hospital increased from 13% in 1993 to 40% in 1995 (P<.001).
CONCLUSIONS: Hospital information system-based
alerts can play an important role in the surveillance and early pre-
vention of MRSA transmission, and it can help to recognize pat-
terns of colonization and transmission (Infect Control Hosp
Epidemiol 1996;17:496-502).
INTRODUCTION
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
has become a worldwide problem, with an important
impact on healthcare costs and medical management.1 In
the United States, hospitals of all sizes are facing an
increasing problem of MRSA.2,3 Some countries, such as
Japan, already have been overwhelmed by the MRSA epi-
demic. In Europe, the prevalence of methicillin resistance
among S aureus isolates ranges from less than 1% in
Scandinavia to more than 30% in France, Spain, and Italy.4
Low-prevalence countries such as The Netherlands or
Belgium try to prevent the escalating problem of MRSA by
use of vigorous infection control and intervention meth-
ods.5,6
Switzerland, with its population of 6.7 million inhabi-
tants, lies in the heart of Europe and covers a surface of
41,295 km2 (25,809 miles2). Methicillin-resistant S aureus
has been reported in all Swiss university hospitals, with the
percentage of S aureus isolates resistant to methicillin rang-
ing from 1% to 23%, but in general below 5%.7 Written guide-
lines for the management of patients with MRSA coloniza-
tion or infection are available in all university hospitals.8
The University Hospital of Geneva (Hôpital Cantonal
Universitaire de Genève [HCUG]) has a relatively high pro-
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portion of patients admitted and readmitted with MRSA: in
1993, 17% of all S aureus isolates in this institution were
methicillin-resistant.
Usually, MRSA is introduced into a hospital by an
infected or colonized patient. After initial dissemination,
MRSA populates human and environmental niches and
establishes reservoirs among persons, sometimes includ-
ing healthcare personnel, who may become colonized and
infected. The prevalent cohort of colonized and infected
patients generally is assumed to be the most significant
reservoir from which MRSA is transmitted to other indi-
viduals.9 Early and appropriate infection control measures
(ICM) are key elements to reduce MRSA transmission and
to control the hospital reservoir.1,10,11
Computer alerts in medicine are a well-known tool to
help notification of medical personnel about a critical action
to be taken or other important in-hospital events.12 One of
the first systems used was the Health Evaluation Through
Logical Processing (HELP) system at Latter Day Saints
Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah.13 Developed since the
1950s, HELP is well known for the implementation of deci-
sion logic mechanisms in various applications. In particu-
lar, the HELP system is used to generate alerts advising
staff of relevant infection surveillance data stored in hospi-
tal information system (HIS) databases.14-16 Other HIS-
based computer alerts have been developed since in vari-
ous fields and applications.
So far, no extensive experience has been published
concerning computer alerts for the surveillance and con-
trol of MRSA. The objective of the present study is to
describe the role of an expert system applied to the control
of MRSA at a large medical center.
METHODS
Hospital 
The University of Geneva Hospital, Switzerland, is a
1,600-bed healthcare center providing primary and tertiary
medical care for Geneva and the surrounding areas
(~1,000,000 population). Approximately 40,000 patients are
admitted annually for a mean length of stay of 11 days. The
Infection Control Program (ICP), established in October
1992, consists of one hospital epidemiologist, one fellow,
and five full-time infection control nurses (ICNs).
Surveillance and Infection Control Measures
Since 1992, the infection control team has conducted
several hospitalwide period-prevalence studies to detect
nosocomial infections at HCUG, using total chart surveil-
lance.17 Collection of data was based on standard defini-
tions.18 The ICP team also conducted prospective, ward-
directed surveillance for nosocomial infections between
October 1992 and December 1995, by twice-weekly visits
in general wards and daily (except weekends) visits in
intensive-care units.
Since January 1993, control measures have been
implemented in an attempt to control the spread of MRSA
within this institution. All patients colonized or infected
with MRSA were followed prospectively from the day of
first MRSA identification to the time of discharge from the
hospital, by weekly or twice weekly visits. Data collection
included patient demographics, underlying illness, comor-
bidities, dates and sites of colonization and infection, device
utilization, exposure to risk factors for MRSA colonization,
type of therapy, and outcome. Information for each patient
was obtained by nursing and medical chart review, review of
laboratory data, clinical examination, and, when necessary,
telephone interviews to private physicians or outside hospi-
tals, and clinical examination. A dedicated case report form
was used, and data were stored in a specially designed data-
base (Microsoft Access, version 2.0, Microsoft Co, Ireland).
The following ICM were used:
(1) All patients colonized or infected with MRSA
were placed on contact isolation, as recommended by
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guide-
lines,19 until the time of discharge or until eradication of
colonization was documented by two consecutive sets of
negative surveillance cultures (separated by at least 24
hours).
(2) Active surveillance cultures for MRSA coloniza-
tion included weekly screening of the nose, axilla, groin,
pressure ulcer, wounds, skin insertion sites of percuta-
neous devices, and urine (if catheter was present). Since
January 1994, routine screening of axilla was omitted,
because it did not improve the sensitivity of the surveillance
cultures to detect MRSA colonization (data not shown).
(3) All patients previously known to be colonized or
infected with MRSA were isolated upon readmission to
HCUG, and surveillance cultures were obtained. Two con-
secutive sets of negative surveillance cultures were
required to end contact isolation.
(4) Only patients with documented MRSA infections
were treated with intravenous antibiotics (usually van-
comycin or teicoplanin). Attempts to eradicate MRSA colo-
nization were undertaken routinely (nasal mupirocin oint-
ment, twice per day for 5 days, and chlorhexidine body
wash for 10 days). Preliminary results have been reported
recently.20
(5) Following successful eradication, patients
remaining in the hospital underwent surveillance cultures
weekly for 4 weeks and then monthly to detect return of
colonization.
(6) To detect MRSA colonization and cross-infection,
surveillance cultures were obtained from roommates as
soon as a patient colonized or infected with MRSA was
newly identified. Whenever positive for MRSA, and when
feasible, the area of surveillance was widened and outbreak
investigation was attempted. Molecular typing of MRSA
isolates (using contour homogeneous electric-field gel elec-
trophoresis) was performed only in case of outbreak inves-
tigation.
Furthermore, patients colonized or infected with
MRSA were identified through a combination of the follow-
ing surveillance techniques:
(1) Since October 1992, clinical microbiology labora-
tory results were monitored daily, excluding weekends, for
isolates of MRSA at any body site. Laboratory technicians
telephoned the ICNs in charge of MRSA surveillance to
inform them of every newly identified patient. In March
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0195941700004641
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 20:14:07, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
498 INFECTION CONTROL AND HOSPITAL EPIDEMIOLOGY August 1996
1994, the automatic laboratory alert (lab alert) system was
implemented (see below), replacing the telephone calls
made by the laboratory technicians. 
(2) Systematic surveillance cultures at the time of
admission to the hospital ward with the highest rate of
MRSA colonization or infection (the septic orthopedic
ward, 45 beds) were implemented in July 1994 to identify
nosocomially acquired infections. This ward was the only
area of the hospital where systematic screening on admis-
sion was performed on all patients.
Definitions
Colonization was defined as the growth of MRSA in
culture from patients without symptoms, signs, or laborato-
ry results meeting the criteria for nosocomial infection.18
Whenever asymptomatic, patients with urine cultures posi-
tive for MRSA were not considered infected, except when
the physician prescribed directed antimicrobial therapy.
Patients were considered to have nosocomial acqui-
sition of MRSA if there was no history of prior MRSA colo-
nization or infection and a previous culture of the site was
negative during hospitalization.21 As proposed by Jernigan
and colleagues,21 in the absence of previous cultures,
patients who were discovered to be colonized or infected
with MRSA less than 72 hours after admission were
assumed to have been admitted with the organism, unless
roommates or other nearby patients were discovered to be
MRSA carriers. Patients discovered more than 72 hours
after admission were considered to be colonized or infected
in our institution, unless medical information suggested
otherwise (eg, transfer from another hospital or from a
nursing home with a previous documentation of MRSA col-
onization).
The attack rate was defined as the number of newly
detected patients colonized or infected with MRSA each year
of the study period (January 1989 through December 1995)
divided by the annual number of patients admitted at HCUG.
An ambulatory patient who attended outpatient clin-
ics of the institution and for whom a future admission was
planned by recording in the HIS was defined as being in
preadmission status.
Microbiology 
S aureus was identified using standard laboratory
procedures.22 The determination of methicillin resistance
was performed by use of an oxacillin (6 mg/mL) salt (2%)
agar screening plate, according to methods recommended
by the National Committee for Clinical Laboratory
Standards for disk diffusion testing.23-25
Hospital Information System and Alerts 
The HIS at HCUG, Division Informatique de
L’Hôpital Cantonal de Genève (DIOGENE), is an open dis-
tributed system of several networked machines.26,27 DIO-
GENE includes many applications related to the patient or to
the hospital. Patient applications include an integrated com-
puterized laboratory system, UNILAB, used for lab order-
ing, results reporting and distribution, and the admission-
discharge-transfer application (ADT). In DIOGENE data-
bases, patients are identified with two numbers, the per-
manent patient identification number and a billing number
that is unique for one patient and one hospital stay. All
patient databases share the same patient number, allowing
linkage of data from different databases.
The lab alert is generated by a UNIX mechanism
implemented on the clinical microbiology laboratory data-
base.28 The lab alert system is time-driven. Every day at
1:15 PM, it generates two files that immediately are printed
in the ICP offices. One of the printed files, “the positive lab
alert,” contains patient information from the laboratory
database for all cultures positive for MRSA identified in the
last 24 hours. The second file lists all surveillance cultures
for MRSA that showed no growth in the laboratory during
the same period. Information on the alerts includes the
patient’s identity, care unit, date of laboratory order, date of
result validation, and type of specimen.
The “readmission alert” is data-driven; it is imple-
mented by an automatic query once per minute to the
HCUG-ADT database. The readmission alert detects
admission of any patient who was colonized or infected
with MRSA during a prior hospital stay at HCUG.28 The
alert is printed in the ICP offices within minutes after
admission. An alert also is generated in case of patient
transfer within the hospital (data not included in the pre-
sent report) or patient discharge from HCUG. Information
sent with the alert includes patient identity; date of admis-
sion, transfer, or discharge; and care unit. In case of admis-
sion through the hospital emergency treatment center, the
alert also is printed there and includes guidelines for the
emergency center staff. 
Statistical Analysis 
Mean quantitative values were compared using the
student’s t test and the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test. The fre-
quencies of qualitative variables were compared using the
chi-squared test (with Yates’ correction, when necessary)
or Fisher’s Exact Test. Linear trends were tested using lin-
ear regression or the chi-squared test for trend, as previ-
ously described.29 Statistical analyses were performed
using Epi Info Software (Epi Info, version 6.0, CDC,
Atlanta, GA) and Systat software (Systat, version 5.2, Systat
Inc, Evanston, IL). All tests were two-tailed, and P< .05 was
considered significant.
RESULTS
MRSA Trends at HCUG
Between 1989 and 1995, there were 270,784 admis-
sions to HCUG, representing a total of 3,164,044 patient-
days of care. Over the 7-year study period, MRSA coloniza-
tion or infection was identified in 1,275 admissions, or 0.47%
of all admissions during that time.
The Figure depicts secular trends in the prevalence of
patients colonized or infected with MRSA at HCUG.
Importantly, incidence rates of MRSA colonization or infec-
tion increased significantly (r2=0.94, P<.001) over the 7 years
of the study, from 0.05 cases per 100 admissions in 1989 to
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0.81 cases per 100 admissions in 1995. The rate of MRSA col-
onization or infection increased significantly (r2=0.92,
P<.043) from 1989 through 1992 (to 0.62 cases per 100
admissions in 1992), but has remained stable since (r2=0.72,
P=.25). The annual attack rate of MRSA colonization or infec-
tion (the number of newly recognized MRSA patients, count-
ing each patient only once) remained stable since 1993 (0.55
± 0.05 cases per 100 admissions, range 0.51 to 0.62), corre-
sponding to the time of implementation of ICM.
Rates of Infection
All hospitalized patients colonized or infected with
MRSA were followed prospectively since January 1993.
Between January 1993 and December 1995, MRSA caused
infections in 352 (42%) of the 843 patients from whom it was
isolated. The frequency distribution of MRSA infections by
site is shown in the Table. The overall rate of MRSA infec-
tion was 3.06 per 1,000 patient admissions from 1993
through 1995 (0.32 episodes per 1,000 patient-days). The
rate of MRSA nosocomial infection was 0.12 episodes per
1,000 patient-days in this period. MRSA was responsible for
10% to 12% of all nosocomial infections identified in subse-
quent hospitalwide period-prevalence studies conducted at
HCUG in September 1994 and June 1995. Overall, MRSA
was the second leading nosocomial pathogen at HCUG,
only surpassed by Escherichia coli.
Laboratory Alert
The lab alert system for positive MRSA results has
functioned since March 1994 at HCUG, and the readmis-
sion alert since June 9, 1994. Because the purpose of the
present work was to describe the role of both alerts, the
first 12 months (July 1, 1994, to June 30, 1995) during
which both alerts were running were evaluated. 
Between July 1994 and June 1995, a total of 1,692
MRSA isolates were identified by the daily lab alert, repre-
senting an average of 4.6 MRSA isolates per day. Those
MRSA isolates corresponded to 314 hospital stays of 248
different patients. Thus, the mean number of MRSA iso-
lates per colonized or infected patient was 5.4 (median 3;
range, 1 to 39).
Because surveillance cultures for MRSA colonization
frequently were negative, lab alerts also identified negative
results. A total of 10,344 negative surveillance cultures col-
lected during 889 hospital admissions were recorded in the
study period. Knowledge of those results was important,
because it helped the ICNs in charge of MRSA surveillance
to adapt ICM promptly when necessary. The time saving
associated with the use of the lab alert system was estimat-
ed to be approximately 1.5 to 2 hours per day for the ICNs
on duty for MRSA. The working time saved for laboratory
technicians who otherwise would have been asked to call
the ICNs for positive MRSA cultures can be estimated as 10
to 15 minutes per working day.
Readmission Alert
The readmission alert was activated each time a
patient known to be colonized or infected with MRSA dur-
ing a prior hospital stay was preadmitted, admitted, or dis-
charged. During the 12-month study period, there were a
total of 1,314 readmission alerts, with 438 admissions, 306
preadmissions, and 570 discharges. The alerts for dis-
charged patients did not require action, but informed the
ICP and helped improve ICNs’ work organization.
The 744 admissions or preadmissions represented
an average of 2.08 alerts per day (3.2 per working day).
Preadmissions of patients previously colonized or infected
with MRSA (n=306) were flagged to help organize future
hospital admission of possibly persistent MRSA carriers;
those alerts usually required a telephone call to the wards
where the patients were scheduled for admission. There
were a total of 438 readmission alerts associated with
patient admission to HCUG during the study period, repre-
senting an average of 1.2 alerts per day. Among the 438
hospital admissions flagged by the readmission alert, sur-
veillance cultures were performed within the first 24 hours
for 347 (79%). Of the 347 patients screened, 114 (33%) were
positive for MRSA, and 233 (67%) were negative. Most of
the patients identified by the readmission alert who did not
undergo surveillance cultures (n=91) had an extremely
short length of hospital stay (median 1 day).
Before 1993, the average interval from admission to
first screening culture positive for MRSA was 25 days for
readmitted patients known to harbor the organism during
a previous hospital stay. In 1993, ICM directed toward
MRSA were implemented throughout the institution,
including a recommendation for labeling of the chart front
page. Nonetheless, the delay between admission and sur-
veillance screening for these patients still averaged 8 days
(median, 1 day). Following implementation of the readmis-
sion alert, previously positive patients were recognized eas-
ily upon readmission to HCUG: the time from admission to
surveillance cultures averaged 3 days (median, 0 days).
Importantly, the proportion of MRSA patients recognized
at the time of admission to the hospital increased signifi-
cantly (P<.001), from 13% (31 of 235) in 1993 to 40% (124 of
310) in 1995.
Interestingly, the 114 patients with persistent MRSA
carriage detected at the time of readmission to HCUG had
FIGURE. Number of patients colonized or infected with methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus at the University Hospital of
Geneva, 1989 to 1995, by month and year (prevalent cases).
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a significantly longer mean hospital stay than did the 233
previously colonized or infected patients with negative sur-
veillance cultures (P<.05; mean, 30.4 days; median, 15 days,
versus 13.9 and 8 days, respectively).
MRSA Reservoirs
Of a total of 314 hospital stays of patients colonized or
infected with MRSA at HCUG between July 1994 and June
1995, 114 (36%) were identified immediately upon readmis-
sion to the institution by means of the readmission alert.
The delay between admission and screening of those
patients was minimal (median, 1 day); immediate imple-
mentation of ICM was possible for a large majority of those
patients (109 of 114, 96%). None of those patients were
responsible for secondary transmission within the institu-
tion, despite prolonged hospital stays (mean, 30.4 days;
range, 1 to 233).
Two hundred additional patients colonized or infect-
ed with MRSA were identified through the lab alert system,
representing 64% of the hospital reservoir during the study
period. Of those 200, all but two were newly identified col-
onized or infected MRSA patients. Of the 198 newly identi-
fied patients, 163 (82%) were detected at least 72 hours after
admission; however, approximately one third (62 of 163)
resulted from nosocomial transmission.
DISCUSSION
Methicillin-resistant S aureus has emerged as a com-
mon nosocomial organism in our hospital and was the sec-
ond leading pathogen in two consecutive hospitalwide preva-
lence surveys for nosocomial infections conducted in 1994
and 1995. According to Boyce,30 HCUG has been a
high–endemic-rate institution for MRSA since 1992, with at
least 0.5 cases per 100 hospital admissions in this large teach-
ing institution. Rates of MRSA admissions increased linearly
between 1989 and 1992, but have remained stable since, pos-
sibly due to the implementation of ICM at the end of 1992.
There are two major mechanisms for introduction of
MRSA into an institution, the most common being the
admission of infected or colonized patients who serve as a
reservoir.9,31,32 The principal mode of MRSA transmis-
sion within the institution is from patient to patient via the
transiently colonized hands of hospital personnel who
acquire the organism after direct patient contact.33
Chronically colonized healthcare workers can disseminate
the organism directly, but such occurrence is less com-
mon.33,34 Several studies examined the effect of isolation
measures to control nosocomial transmission of MRSA and
found a decrease in the incidence of endemic MRSA infec-
tion and colonization after adopting barrier isolation pre-
cautions.9,33,35,36 Early implementation of ICM obviously
is recommended, and laboratory alert systems may help in
this regard.
In endemic or outbreak settings, surveillance is
required to determine the degree and extent of the hospi-
tal reservoir. The presence of MRSA usually is discovered
via routine cultures of infections from hospitalized patients;
but routine cultures identify only approximately one third
of the hospitalized patients harboring the organ-
ism.9,31,37,38 An additional one third of the MRSA hospi-
tal reservoir can be identified through an admission identi-
fication list of all patients harboring the organism during a
previous admission or outpatient visit.33 The final one third
of MRSA patients can be detected by cultures of frequently
colonized body sites (ie, wounds, tracheostomy sites, tra-
cheal aspirates from intubated patients, etc) from asympto-
matic patients,37 as well as from roommates of newly iden-
tified colonized or infected patients.
Our study confirms and extends those findings: 36%
of the hospital reservoir of MRSA patients at HCUG
between July 1994 and June 1995 was recognized at the
time of admission by the use of the readmission alert. In
the study by Lugeon et al,39 80% of all episodes of MRSA
colonization or infection identified over a 4-year period
were considered hospital acquired, but developed before
the implementation of ICM. Delay in implementing those
measures is associated with increased risk for MRSA
spread to other patients; readmission alert systems can
contribute significantly to reductions in delays.
Furthermore, MRSA carriage was confirmed in 33% of
patients screened upon readmission in our study; based on
these data, immediate implementation of ICM upon read-
mission, without definitive proof of current MRSA carriage,
appears reasonable. Lack of similar information in the liter-
ature prevents comparison of our data with those of others.
Attempts to use the computer in medical diagnosis
have been mostly unsatisfactory; nevertheless, there is a
steady increase in the use of computers as support tools for
clinical decisions40-45 or infection control.14-16,46 Since
1994, we have used the automated lab and readmission alert
system, which facilitates the investigation and control of the
spread of MRSA in our institution. The lab alert is particu-
larly useful for work organization and patient follow-up,
whereas the role of the readmission alert is oriented more
toward early prevention. Both alerts also are useful tools for
diagnosis, treatment, teaching, and quality assessment. This
alert system has replaced the slow, time-consuming infor-
mation system that was based on personal communication to
the ICNs after identification of a new or readmitted MRSA-
TABLE
DISTRIBUTION BY SITE OF 401 MRSA INFECTIONS AMONG
352 PATIENTS, HCUG, 1993 TO 1995
Number (%)
Surgical site infection 142 (35)
Urinary tract infection 109 (27)
Bloodstream infection 54 (13)
Pneumonia 33 (8)
Skin/soft tissue infection 19 (5)
Osteomyelitis/arthritis 10 (3)
Intraabdominal infection/abscess 5 (1)
Other 29 (7)
Abreviations: MRSA, methicillin- resistant Staphylococcus aureus.
HCUG, Hospital Cantonal Universitaire de Genève.
“Other” included intravenous catheter-associated infections, conjunctivitis, menin-
gitis, otitis, and more.
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patient. Furthermore, the alert system helps greatly to
reduce the time to detect and isolate a new or readmitted
MRSA patient. Thus, our system is a time-saving tool for our
program.
Some limitations of computer alert systems should
be mentioned. First, the development and use of automat-
ed hospital database and alert systems is costly, and no
analysis of the cost-effectiveness has been performed in
our institution so far. The combination of isolation precau-
tions, extended screening, and mupirocin or systemic
antibiotic treatment of MRSA carriers have been reported
to be efficacious21,37,38,47 and cost-effective.21,38
Nevertheless, the timely computer alerting of MRSA
patients is likely to contribute to substantial cost savings by
preventing early, uncontrolled MRSA transmission and by
providing a substantial time saving for the ICP. Second, the
protection of individual patient records might be difficult in
some circumstances; data from a computer alert system
should not be easily accessible for persons outside the ICP.
Third, our study results are limited by the lack of system-
atic microbiological typing for all MRSA isolates.
Finally, we want to underline that computer alert sys-
tems are only a tool to help the ICP. We endorse the “shoe-
leather” approach of the hospital epidemiologist recently
described by Weems in this journal.48 This approach
emphasizes the field activities of the infection control inves-
tigator: “pounding the pavement, tracking the evidence,
conducting face-to-face interviews, putting one’s nose into
the problem, and using common sense to complement sta-
tistical analysis of data.”48
Nevertheless, in our experience, a computer system
to alert and assist in performing surveillance and detec-
tion of MRSA-colonization and infection in hospital
patients is a useful tool. We recently expanded computer
alerts to include surveillance of other nosocomial
pathogens (Stenotrophomonas maltophilia, Serratia
marcescens, vancomycin-resistant enterococci) and nosoco-
mial bloodstream infections. As hospital information sys-
tems improve, this kind of alert system offers great
promise for the improved surveillance and control of noso-
comial pathogens.
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Martin S. Favero, PhD
Medical News Editors
The CDC has sponsored three
previous international conferences on
the control of nosocomial infections,
in 1970, 1980, and 1990. Plans cur-
rently are underway for the newest
and largest of these conferences, to
be held April 16-19, 2000, at the
Marriott Marquis Hotel in Atlanta,
Georgia. The Year 2000 conference is
sponsored by the CDC and the
National Foundation for Infectious
Diseases (NFID), and is co-
sponsored by the Association for
Professionals in Infection Control and
Epidemiology, Inc (APIC), and the
Society for Healthcare Epidemiology
of America, Inc (SHEA), in coopera-
tion with the American Hospital
Association (AHA). The Year 2000
conference will be held in conjunction
with SHEA’s 10th Annual Meeting in
the year 2000.
The Year 2000 Coordinating
Committee, chaired by the director of
the CDC’s Hospital Infections
Program, with representatives from
NFID, APIC, SHEA, and AHA, met
recently at the CDC in Atlanta to plan
the conference. It is estimated that
2,000 individuals will attend. For the
first time, there will be commercial
exhibits at the conference. Regis-
tration, the opening session, and a
reception are scheduled for Saturday,
April 15, and plenary, concurrent, and
poster sessions will be held through
Wednesday, April 19, 2000. Publicity
plans are being made.
Fourth Decennial Conference on Nosocomial Infections, Year 2000
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